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Abstract 
This paper is written from the perspective of a national safety regulator who wishes to 
help enable the new technology of carbon capture and storage (CCS) so that national and 
global strategic priorities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be met. Example CCS 
hazards are discussed. There is a substantial and ever increasing body of information 
about CCS. This requires proactive knowledge management to understand and prioritise 
gaps. The process used by the UK HSE is outlined. Examples are given of current gaps in 
knowledge, including regulatory considerations, guidance and standards related to CCS. 
© 2010 UK Crown copyright 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is written from the perspective of a national safety regulator, the UK Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) who wishes to help enable the new technology of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) so that national and global strategic priorities to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions can be met. Indeed, HSE has set up an Emerging Energy 
Technologies (EET) Programme to consider and help enable the range of new energy 
technologies being incorporated into the UK’s energy mix. These include liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) importation and gas storage, clean coal technologies, the hydrogen 
economy and renewable technologies (including biomass). CCS is recognised as a key 
technology, which is required to grow rapidly in the short to medium term to meet targets 
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for greenhouse gas emissions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) roadmap for CCS 
[1] helps to define the stages and timetable required. 
A safety regulator can help enable a new technology in a number of ways. Regulatory 
certainty is important for industry and investors to be able to commit to funding new 
CCS projects. A good understanding of the hazards and how they can be controlled is 
also very important. Public perception of CCS could be adversely affected if significant 
incidents were to occur early in its uptake. Gaps in knowledge that could prevent the 
demonstration of safety by a CCS project need to be identified early and addressed. The 
UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), with the support of the Health and Safety 
Laboratory (HSL), has therefore taken a proactive approach in assessing the safety and 
health challenges and gaps in technical knowledge, and some of this work is described in 
this paper. 
2.  Hazards from CCS 
Hazards from CCS processes have been systematically identified in a number of 
studies. These are reported in, for example, Connolly & Cusco [2] and Wilday et al [3]. 
Although it is not classified as “toxic”, CO2 is more than just an asphyxiant and causes 
physiological effects including increased breathing rate and acidosis. This has caused 
HSE to set both major hazards toxic dose criteria [4] and offshore impairment criteria [5] 
for CO2. Other potentially hazardous properties include low temperatures on release or 
blowdown and the propensity to dissolve in elastomers, causing potential damage to 
elastomer seals on decompression.  
Identification of hazards depends on an understanding of the design of CCS systems 
including capture, transport and injection (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Long-term 
underground storage is outside the remit of HSE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Components in the CCS chain 
Some example hazards, which focus on possible major accident hazards, from CCS are 
included in Table 2. A more comprehensive list of hazards is given in reference [3]. 
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Table 1:  CCS technologies 
Component of 
CCS chain 
Technology 
Post-combustion capture. Capture from the flue gas by contacting 
with a solvent, e.g. an amine. Includes absorption, stripping, 
compression and drying. 
Pre-combustion capture. This involves Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) producing synthesis gas (H2 and CO) with a 
shift reactor to convert CO to CO2 followed by CO2 capture, 
compression and drying.  
Capture 
(3 main alternative 
technologies) 
Oxyfuel combustion capture.  The fuel is burnt in oxygen (diluted 
with recycled flue gases) and produces a CO2 - rich flue gas requiring 
purification and compression. 
Pipeline. This is likely to develop into pipeline networks serving 
several sources of captured CO2 and possibly several injection sites.  
Intermediate storage might be required. 
Transport  
(2 options that 
could be used in 
combination) Ship. Intermediate storage and refrigeration facilities at the docks 
would be needed.  
Injection (into 
storage) 
In the UK injection is to be offshore, and may use existing offshore 
installations. Booster compression/pumping may be needed and 
possible heating/vaporisation if transported by ship. 
 
Table 2:  Example CCS hazards 
Component of 
CCS chain 
Example hazards 
Enhanced combustion leading to fire or explosion as a result of loss of 
containment of oxygen 
Fire due to loss of containment of amine (or other flammable solvent 
used for CO2 capture). 
Capture 
Explosion due to loss of containment of synthesis gas (pre-
combustion capture), possibly made worst by congestion introduced 
by retrofit of CCS. 
Loss of containment of CO2 from pipeline causing a hazard to people 
due to its toxicity and low temperature. 
Transport 
Loss of containment of CO2 from refrigerated intermediate storage 
causing a hazard to people due to its low temperature and high 
concentration toxicity. 
Injection (into 
storage) 
Loss of containment of CO2 from delivery or injection riser causing a 
hazard to people due to its toxicity and low temperature, especially 
given semi-confinement. Possible escalation to hydrocarbon systems 
(causing fire/explosion) or platform structure due to cold 
embrittlement. 
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3. Knowledge management 
There is considerable global research and development into CCS technologies. There 
are also a number of demonstration projects, which are starting, or at the planning stage 
worldwide, and each of these will provide additional technical data and may modify the 
technology base. HSE has therefore found it essential to capture and manage knowledge 
about CCS relevant to the regulation of health and safety risks. To this end, a knowledge 
management document [6] has been assembled and is periodically updated, because of 
the rapid developments in CCS. Topics addressed are: 
• Perceptions of CCS 
• Whether carbon dioxide can give rise to a major accident hazard 
• Non-CCS uses of carbon dioxide 
• Views of other regulators worldwide 
• Regulation of CO2 worldwide 
• HSE needs in terms of 
o Giving land-use planning advice 
o Assessing Seveso Directive safety reports 
o Assessing designs of pipelines 
o Assessing offshore safety cases 
• EU CCS Demonstration Projects 
• International initiatives 
• R&D projects (especially focused on safety) 
• Major CCS events, conferences etc 
 Additionally a spreadsheet/ database has been compiled for CCS, which manages and 
provides analysis of knowledge on CCS in the following areas. The overall aim has been 
to identify gaps relevant to HSE’s remit and to prioritise activities to fill these gaps.  This 
is illustrated in Figure 2. 
3.1. Hazard and risk profile assessment 
This is a high-level hazard identification starting with components of CCS technology. 
Identified hazards are rated in terms of consequence, likelihood and risk. There is also an 
assessment of whether the identified hazard has major accident potential, and whether it 
is already addressed by existing UK legislation. Some of the identified hazards have been 
given as examples in Table 2. 
3.2. Regulatory framework 
Components of the CCS chain are considered together with HSE’s regulatory process. 
Current and proposed regulations are identified that are relevant to each CCS component. 
Proposed government regulations include, for example, the Carbon Capture Directive 
and the requirements for all new combustion plants (gas, coal or biomass) at or above 
300 MW to be carbon capture ready (CCR) and to set aside space to accommodate future 
carbon capture equipment. This leads to an analysis of whether there are potential health 
and safety regulatory gaps relevant to CCS projects for the UK. 
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Figure 2:  CCS Knowledge Management 
 
3.3. Standards and guidance 
Standards and guidance relevant to CCS have also been identified.  This has again 
been done in terms of each component of the CCS chain.  It includes standards and 
guidance, which are: 
• Directly relevant to CCS 
• Intended for other applications, with read-across to CCS 
• Currently in development. 
This has allowed the identification and prioritization of gaps in standards and guidance, 
and in the knowledge needed to develop them. 
4. Potential Regulatory gaps 
The health and safety of people affected by work activities in the UK is regulated 
under the generic framework of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA). This 
sets general duties on employers and others (e.g. manufacturers of work equipment) to 
ensure so far as is reasonably practicable the health and safety of people affected by work 
activities. For HSE, a key consideration, derived from the UK Government’s better 
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regulation principles when considering new specific regulation, is: why is the UK generic 
safety framework insufficient? Two potential regulatory gaps, which were identified by 
the above process, are discussed here as examples.  
It is expected that transport of CO2 will be predominantly by pipeline. The Pipelines 
Safety Regulations (PSR) are UK national regulations which require land-use planning 
controls to apply to pipelines containing dangerous fluids; however, CO2 is not defined 
as a dangerous fluid. A risk assessment was carried out to compare the risks from CO2 
and natural gas pipelines [7].  Natural gas was chosen as it is the most common 
dangerous fluid transferred by pipeline.  Although, the hazards associated with natural 
gas are for the most part attributed to its flammability and those for CO2 related 
predominantly to its toxicity, the findings from this work suggest that consideration be 
given to whether a CO2 pipeline gives rise to sufficient risk for CO2 to be included as a 
dangerous fluid. This was included in a recent consultation on revision of PSR [8,9]. The 
outcome of the consultation was inconclusive on this point and HSE is giving further 
consideration to this issue, applying the better regulation principles.  
The Seveso II Directive regulates onshore major accident hazards in the EU and is 
implemented in the UK as the COMAH Regulations. CO2 is not a dangerous substance 
under Seveso, however, it is possible that capture sites may indeed be regulated under 
Seveso, in the future, depending on the quantities and types of other substances used, e.g. 
flammable amines or other solvents used to capture the CO2; oxygen used in some 
capture technologies (see Table 1). The UK response to the recent review of Seveso 
suggested that the European Commission should look at whether the Directive should be 
extended to include CO2 sequestration and storage activities. A technical paper was 
provided by the UK to aid discussion [10] on amending the Seveso Directive to include 
CO2 as a named substance. It also highlights knowledge gaps in current modeling of CO2 
releases. This is not a formal UK negotiating position for amendment to the Seveso II 
Directive as it is not yet determined that the generic safety framework of HSWA is 
insufficient. We are currently applying HSWA to our assessment of current CCS projects 
as if the principles of the Seveso II Directive apply.  
5. Knowledge gaps 
Some key knowledge gaps, which give rise to research priorities, are discussed here.  
5.1. Technology 
The hazard and risk profile for CCS projects will clearly depend on the technology 
adopted. For example, if intermediate storage of CO2 proves necessary in order to 
mitigate pipeline operational issues, then the quantities involved could be substantial and 
the process would be less inherently safe. It is hoped that forthcoming demonstration 
projects (UK and worldwide) will resolve this and other issues relating to the system 
design.  
5.2. Source term modeling 
It is necessary to be able to model the consequences of a major release of CO2 in order 
to inform layout and other safeguards and to demonstrate safety. CO2 is likely to be piped 
as a dense phase liquid (above the thermodynamic critical pressure but below the critical 
temperature) as shown in Figure 3. This means that, upon release, a two-phase mixture of 
CO2 solid and vapour will be formed. Estimated hazard ranges are very sensitive to 
source term model assumptions. Issues include: how to model a source term, which 
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contains solid, experimental validation for such models, and modeling of releases from 
pipelines where fracture propagation is a possibility [11]. A version of the consequence 
modeling tool PHAST, which models some aspects of source terms involving solid CO2 
has been developed by DNV [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Phase diagram for carbon dioxide showing approximate operating range for     
pipelines 
HSE/HSL have taken opportunities to raise the above issues with industry. Research 
initiatives include the current EU CO2PIPEHAZ project [13] that is developing source 
term models for CO2 releases from pipelines and that will include CO2 release 
experiments conducted in China for validation purposes. HSE provided a member of the 
Technical Reference Group for the CO2PipeTrans Joint Industry Project (JIP) led by 
DNV and intends to support Phase 2, which will carry out experimental validation for 
source term models.  
5.3. Standards and guidance 
As might be expected for a developing technology, most standards and guidance are 
either (i) currently high level, or (ii) addressing other applications with some read across 
to CCS. It should also be noted that there is currently a lack of internationally recognised 
standards and codes of practice specifically for dense phase or supercritical CO2 plant 
and equipment. When designing, fabricating and maintaining plant for handling and 
transporting CO2 it is important that the full significance its physical properties, at the 
temperatures, pressures and inventories required are fully recognised and managed 
accordingly. When applying standards developed for other substances, including 
hydrocarbons such as natural gas, extreme caution is required, as even the highest 
standards for many other substances may not be sufficient to ensure adequate 
containment for CO2 within the expected (and unexpected) operating envelope(s). 
For CO2 pipelines, recently published guidance includes a Recommended Practice 
[14], which was produced as a result of the CO2PipeTrans Phase 1 JIP.   
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6. Conclusions 
There is a substantial and ever increasing body of information about CCS. This 
requires proactive knowledge management to understand and prioritise gaps. The process 
used by the UK HSE has been outlined. 
Technical evidence suggests that CO2, when captured, transported and injected in the 
quantities required for CCS, has major accident potential. 
Examples have been given of current gaps in knowledge, including guidance and 
standards related to CCS. We also describe the process for considering whether new 
regulation might be necessary in due course. 
7. References 
[1] IEA (2009) Technology Roadmap Carbon Capture and Storage, 
http://www.iea.org/papers/2009/CCS_Roadmap.pdf 
[2] Connolly, S. and Cusco, L, (2007), “Hazards From High Pressure Carbon Dioxide 
Releases During Carbon Dioxide Sequestration Processes”, IChemE Symposium 
Series No 153 
[3] Wilday A J, Moonis M, Wardman MW, Johnson M (2009), Safety in Carbon Dioxide 
Capture, Transport and Storage, International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas R&D 
Programme (IEAGHG) Technical Report No 2009/6. 
[4] HSE, (2008), Assessment of the Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) for Specified Level of 
Toxicity (SLOT) and Significant Likelihood of Death (SLOD), 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/haztox.htm, revised 21.10.08 
[5] HSE, (2009), Indicative human vulnerability to the hazardous agents present offshore 
for application in risk assessment of major accidents, SPC/Tech/OSD/30, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/hid/spc/spctosd30.htm 
[6] Shuter D M & Bilio M, (2010), Carbon capture and storage (CCS) Knowledge 
Management, HSL Report.  To be published. 
[7] Wilday A J, McGillivray A, Harper P & Wardman, M. (2009), A comparison of 
hazard and risks for carbon dioxide and natural gas pipelines, IChemE Symposium 
Series No 155, 392-398 [8]  
[8] HSE, (2009), Consultation on Amendments to the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 
and the Health and Safety (Fees) Regulations, CD 228, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/consult/condocs/cd228.htm  
[9] HSE, (2010), Summary of the PSR consultation, HSE website (please email: 
pipelines@hse.gsi.gov.uk for link) 
[10] Harper P, (2010), The Inclusion of CO2 as a Hazardous Substance in the Seveso 
Directive, HSE paper to EC Review of the Seveso II Directive, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/seveso/co2-hazardous-substance.pdf 
[11] Bilio M, Brown S, Fairweather M and Mahgerefteh H, (2009), CO2 pipelines 
material and safety considerations, IChemE Symposium Series No 155, 423-429 
[12] Witlox H, Harper M & Odeyemi O, (2009), Modelling of discharge and atmospheric 
dispersion for carbon dioxide releases, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 22, 795–802 
[13] UCL (2010), CO2PipeHaz: Quantitative Failure Consequence Hazard Assessment 
for Next Generation CO2 Pipelines, 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucemsm0/CO2PipeHaz.htm 
[14] DNV (2010), Recommended Practice DNV-RP-J202 Design and Operation of CO2 
Pipelines, 
http://www.dnv.com/industry/energy/segments/carbon_capture_storage/recommended
_practice_guidelines/ 
 
 
This publication and the work it describes were funded by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE).  Its contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are 
those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy. 
2268 D. Shuter et al. / Energy Procedia 4 (2011) 2261–2268
